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Section 15(2), Ameliorative Programs 
and Proportionality Review 
Jena McGill* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In its 2008 decision in R. v. Kapp,1 the Supreme Court of Canada 
staked out new terrain for section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.2 In addition to restating the analytic framework for 
section 15(1) of the Charter, the Court in Kapp concluded for the 
first time that section 15(2) has independent interpretive force to uphold 
ameliorative government laws and programs intended to improve the 
situations of disadvantaged individuals or groups. Sections 15(1) and 
15(2) were described by the Court as “working together to promote 
substantive equality”.3  
In the five years since Kapp, the Supreme Court has endorsed and 
continued to develop its new approach to equality under the Charter. 
Cases including Withler v. Canada (Attorney General)4 (addressing the 
role of comparator groups in section 15(1)), Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development) v. Cunningham5 (elaborating the scope of 
the section 15(2) protection for ameliorative programs) and Eric v. Lola6 
(considering the foundational concepts of prejudice and stereotyping in 
                                                                                                             
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. I am grateful to Benjamin 
Berger for his encouragement at the outset of this project, and for valuable suggestions on the draft; 
to Vanessa MacDonnell, Daphne Gilbert and Amy Salyzyn for insightful comments on earlier 
versions of the paper; and to an anonymous reviewer who provided exceptionally thorough and 
helpful feedback. 
1  [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kapp”]. 
2  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
3  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 37. 
4  [2011] S.C.J. No. 12, [2011] 1 S.C.R. 396 (S.C.C.). 
5  [2011] S.C.J. No. 37, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 670 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cunningham”]. 
6  Quebec (Attorney General) v. A., [2013] S.C.J. No. 5, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (S.C.C.) 
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section 15) have confirmed the Kapp framework as the new paradigm for 
evaluating equality claims under section 15. 
The Kapp framework has inspired a variety of commentary and 
critique from Canadian equality scholars, activists and advocates, and 
increased attention has been devoted to the operation of section 15(2) 
and the Court’s new approach to ameliorative programs since the 2011 
decision in Cunningham.7 This article aims to contribute to the 
growing discussion on section 15(2).8 In particular, I am motivated by 
the limits of the Kapp analysis for equality claimants arguing that a 
government law or program with an ameliorative purpose is under-
inclusive or has discriminatory effects. In these kinds of equality 
cases, the Kapp framework may give rise to results that are 
fundamentally inconsistent with the principle of substantive equality. 
This problem was first recognized immediately following the Kapp 
decision by Professors Jonnette Watson Hamilton and Jennifer 
Koshan, who identified the need for “a framework for reconciling the 
new role of s. 15(2) and claims of under-inclusive ameliorative 
programs”.9 The analysis in this paper proposes that proportionality 
might be one way of mitigating the risks posed by the Kapp 
framework to claims of under-inclusiveness or adverse effects when an 
ameliorative program is at issue.  
I suggest that because the Supreme Court has situated section 15(2) 
as an exemptive provision pursuant to which a government law or 
                                                                                                             
7  See, e.g., Sophia Moreau, “R. v. Kapp: New Directions for Section 15” (2008-2009) 40 
Ottawa L. Rev. 283; Diana Majury, “Equality Kapped; Media Unleashed” (2009) 27 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 1 [hereinafter “Majury”]; Michael H. Morris & Joseph K. Cheng, “Lovelace and Law 
Revisited: The Substantive Equality Promise of Kapp” (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 281 [hereinafter 
“Morris & Cheng”]; Patricia Hughes, “Resiling from Reconciling? Musing on R. v. Kapp” (2009) 47 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 255 [hereinafter “Hughes”]; Jonnette Watson Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Courting 
Confusion? Three Recent Alberta Cases on Equality Rights Post-Kapp” (2009-2010) 47 Alta. 
L. Rev. 927 [hereinafter “Watson Hamilton & Koshan, ‘Courting Confusion?’”]; Jonnette Watson 
Hamilton & Jennifer Koshan, “Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality after Withler” (2011-12) 
16 Rev. Const. Stud. 31; Beverley Bains, “Comparing Canadian Women” (2012) 20:2 Feminist 
Legal Studies 89. 
8  See, e.g., Luc Tremblay, “Promoting Equality and Combating Discrimination through 
Affirmative Action: The Same Challenge? Questioning the Canadian Substantive Equality 
Paradigm” (2012) 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 181 [hereinafter “Tremblay”]; Jonnette Watson Hamilton & 
Jennifer Koshan, “The Supreme Court, Ameliorative Programs and Disability: Not Getting It” 
(2013) 25 C.J.W.L. 56 [hereinafter “Watson Hamilton & Koshan, ‘Not Getting It’”]. 
9  Watson Hamilton & Koshan, “Courting Confusion?”, supra, note 7, at 927. 
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program may be “saved”10 from scrutiny under section 15(1) or section 1 
of the Charter, section 15(2) is now best understood as an internal limit 
on the section 15 equality guarantee. Given that section 15(2) effectively 
supplants section 1, the contours of the section 15(2) limit should be 
defined according to the general framework of proportionality review — 
akin to the Oakes11 test undertaken in section 1 of the Charter — 
requiring a government to justify not only the purpose of an ameliorative 
program, but also its means and effects. Importing proportionality review 
into section 15(2) aligns with the purpose of section 15(2) and the 
principles of Charter adjudication. Most importantly, proportionality 
review would mitigate the risks that inhere when section 15(2) is used to 
“save” under-inclusive ameliorative laws or programs or those with 
discriminatory effects on marginalized groups from full scrutiny under 
section 15(1) and section 1. 
I begin Part II by revisiting the paradigm shift that occurred in Kapp, 
mapping the Supreme Court’s path from early jurisprudence on 
section 15(2) in Lovelace v. Ontario12 to Cunningham,13 the latest decision 
in which the Supreme Court confirmed and expanded its approach to 
ameliorative laws and programs under the Charter. Part III highlights the 
problematic impacts of the Kapp framework for section 15 arguments 
premised on the alleged underinclusiveness or discriminatory effects of 
an ameliorative law or program. This part concludes that in its 
application to these kinds of equality claims, the Kapp analysis is 
inconsistent with the principle of substantive equality. 
The final section proposes a re-reading of section 15(2) that could 
mitigate the challenges outlined in Part III, within the general parameters 
of the Kapp framework. Part IV begins with the proposition that after 
Cunningham, section 15(2) is best understood as an internal limit on 
section 15 that supplants section 1, operative where an ameliorative law 
or program is at issue. I then make the case that proportionality review 
similar to that undertaken in section 1 should be expressly incorporated 
into the section 15(2) framework. I explain why proportionality is the 
appropriate conceptual tool to define the section 15(2) limit, and consider  
 
                                                                                                             
10  The language of “saving” was used to describe the purpose of s. 15(2) in Cunningham, 
supra, note 5, at paras. 40-41, 44-45 and 49. 
11  R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Oakes”]. 
12  [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Lovelace”]. 
13  Supra, note 5. 
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in brief how the various elements of proportionality at the section 15(2) 
stage might be similar or different from the Oakes test under section 1 of 
the Charter.  
1. Shifting Frameworks: From Lovelace to Cunningham  
(a) History and Purpose of Section 15(2) 
Equality is widely considered the most “conceptually difficult” 
provision in the Charter.14 In the seminal case of Andrews v. Law Society 
of British Columbia, McIntyre J., for a unanimous Supreme Court, 
suggested that part of the difficulty in interpreting equality lies in the fact 
that the idea itself “lacks precise definition”.15 The language of section 15 
of the Charter reflects the definitional ambiguity of the protected ideal:  
 15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the 
right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability. 
 (2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity 
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged 
individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or 
physical disability.16 
Section 15(2) was incorporated into the Charter as a direct response 
to concerns that the inclusion of the general principle of equality in 
section 15(1) could make governments susceptible to “reverse 
discrimination” claims similar to those underway in the United States at 
the time the Charter was drafted.17 “Reverse discrimination” refers 
                                                                                                             
14  Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 
1 S.C.R. 497, at 507 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. See also Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, 
“Equality: The Most Difficult Right” (2001) 14 S.C.L.R. (2d) 17, at 17, describing the “daunting” 
challenge faced by Canadian courts in interpreting s. 15. 
15  Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] S.C.J. No. 6, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 
at 164 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Andrews”].  
16  Charter, supra, note 2, at s. 15. 
17  Morris & Cheng, supra, note 7, at 283. See also Walter S. Tarnopolsky, “The Equality 
Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 242, at 247, 
explaining that s. 15(2) was added out of “excessive caution” arising from the American experience; 
and Lovelace, supra, note 12, at paras. 105-106. At the time the Charter was drafted, the case of 
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broadly to challenges by members of relatively more advantaged or 
powerful groups to government laws or programs that target historically 
disadvantaged or less powerful groups for certain benefits or 
ameliorative treatment.18 Without express protection for ameliorative 
government programs, the Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution19 had been — and continues to be20 — relied on to ground 
claims that ameliorative programs constitute a violation of the equality 
rights of relatively more advantaged individuals and groups.  
The inclusion of section 15(2) in the Canadian Charter signalled a 
rejection of the American approach, in favour of a substantive 
understanding of equality focused on accommodating difference to 
ensure equality of results.21 The purpose of section 15(2) is to “reinforce 
the important insight that substantive equality requires positive action to 
ameliorate the conditions of socially disadvantaged groups”.22 
Governments must be free to engage in ameliorative programming 
                                                                                                             
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (S.C. 1978), involving a successful 
challenge to an affirmative action admissions program at Davis Medical School that reserved 16 of 
every 100 entrance spots for “economically and/or educationally disadvantaged and minority” 
applicants, was likely fresh in the minds of the Charter framers.  
18  Tess Sheldon, The Shield Becomes the Sword: The Expansion of the Ameliorative 
Program Defence to Programs that Support Persons with Disabilities (Law Commission of Ontario 
and ARCH Disability Law Centre, 2010), online: Law Commission of Ontario <http://www.lco-
cdo.org/disabilities/sheldon.pdf> [hereinafter “ARCH Report”], at 13. 
19  U.S. Const., Amend V & XIV. In Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (S.C. 1896), 
Harlan J. (dissenting on the constitutionality of racial segregation) gave perhaps the most notorious 
explanation of this approach, stating, “Our constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates 
classes among citizens....” See, e.g., Roozbeh Baker, “Balancing Competing Priorities: Affirmative 
Action in the United States and Canada (2009) 18 Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 527. 
The success of “reverse discrimination” claims under the United States Constitution was made 
possible in part by the interpretation of equality as requiring like treatment for all similarly situated 
citizens. 
20  See, e.g., Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. __ (2013). 
21  On substantive equality see, generally, Fay Faraday, Margaret Denike & M. Kate 
Stephenson, eds., Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality under the Charter 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) [hereinafter “Faraday, Denike & Stephenson”]. 
22  Colleen Sheppard, Litigating the Relationship Between Equity and Equality (Study 
Paper) (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1993), at 28 [hereinafter “Sheppard”]. See also 
Morris & Cheng, supra, note 7, at 283. Early equality jurisprudence confirmed that in the Canadian 
context, “the interests of true equality may well require differentiation in treatment” see, e.g., 
Andrews, supra, note 15, at 169, citing R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] S.C.J. No. 17, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 
295, at 347 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Big M”]. 
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without the threat that “reverse discrimination” claims by more 
advantaged individuals and groups might undermine their efforts.23  
(b) Interpreting Section 15(2): From Lovelace to Cunningham 
Following a number of inconsistent lower court judgments on the 
scope and operation of section 15(2),24 the Supreme Court of Canada 
first considered the matter in its 2000 decision in Lovelace v. Ontario.25 
At issue in Lovelace was the Ontario First Nations Fund (the “Fund”), a 
program that restricted profits from on-reserve casinos to bands 
registered under the Indian Act26 in order to “ameliorate the social, 
cultural and economic conditions of band communities”.27 The claimants 
in Lovelace were Aboriginal groups and communities not registered 
under the Indian Act that argued they should also be entitled to share in 
casino profits.  
Although the claim in Lovelace was decided under section 15(1),28 
the Supreme Court expounded on the relationship between section 15(1) 
and section 15(2).29 The Court acknowledged two possible interpretive 
approaches to section 15(2): it could be understood as an “interpretive 
aid” to section 15(1), providing “conceptual depth and clarity on the 
substantive nature of equality”; or, it could be read “as an exemption or a 
                                                                                                             
23  Mark A. Drumbl & John D. R. Craig, “Affirmative Action in Question: A Coherent 
Theory for Section 15(2)” (1997) 4 Rev. Const. Stud. 80, at 81 [hereinafter “Drumbl & Craig”], 
describe the mandate of s. 15(2) as “prima facie limitless”.  
24  See, e.g., Manitoba Rice Farmers Assn. v. Manitoba (Human Rights Commission), [1987] 
M.J No. 553, 50 Man. R. (2d) 92 (Man. Q.B.) [hereinafter “Manitoba Rice Farmers”]; MacVicar 
v. British Columbia (Family and Child Services), [1986] B.C.J. No. 1712, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 
488 (B.C.S.C.). 
25  Supra, note 12.  
26  R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. 
27  Lovelace, supra, note 12, at para. 74. 
28  The Court applied the newly developed Law framework and held that although the 
claimants in Lovelace had demonstrated that they experienced pre-existing disadvantage, stereotype 
and vulnerability akin to those bands targeted by the Fund, they “failed to establish that the First Nations 
Fund functioned by device of stereotype”. The Court was of the view that the distinction drawn 
between registered Indian bands and non-registered groups and communities “corresponded to the 
actual situation of individuals it affects, and the exclusion did not undermine the ameliorative 
purpose of the targeted program”. As a result, the Fund was found not to infringe s. 15(1) and did 
“not engage the remedial function of the equality right”: id., at para. 73.  
29  The Ontario Court of Appeal in Lovelace v. Ontario, [1997] O.J. No. 2313, 33 O.R. (3d) 
735 (Ont. C.A.), had resolved the case on the basis of s. 15(2). 
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defence to the applicability of the s. 15(1) discrimination analysis”.30 The 
Court concluded that the correct interpretation was to understand 
section 15(2) as “confirmatory and supplementary”31 of section 15(1), but 
acknowledged, “we may well wish to reconsider this matter at a future time 
in the context of another case”.32 Understood as an interpretive aid without 
independent force, section 15(2) was rendered largely insignificant after 
Lovelace.33  
However, the ameliorative purpose or effect of an impugned law or 
program was absorbed into the analytical framework for section 15(1) in 
Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration).34 In 
establishing its heavily critiqued Law analysis,35 a unanimous Supreme 
Court identified human dignity as the touchstone of the equality 
guarantee.36 The ameliorative purpose or effect of an impugned law or 
program was one of four “contextual factors” relevant to whether 
differential treatment on the basis of an enumerated or analogous ground 
amounted to an infringement of a claimant’s human dignity in violation 
of section 15(1).37 The Court in Law acknowledged the possibility that a 
law or program could have an ameliorative purpose or effect in respect of 
one historically disadvantaged group, while at the same time 
discriminating (in the section 15(1) sense of infringing human dignity) 
against another historically disadvantaged group.38 The Court suggested 
                                                                                                             
30  Lovelace, supra, note 12, at para. 97. For further perspectives on the early debates on the 
appropriate role of s. 15(2) see, e.g., Edward M. Iacobucci “Antidiscrimination and Affirmative 
Action Policies: Economic Efficiency and the Constitution” (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293, 
at 326; Drumbl & Craig, supra, note 23, at 85; Michael Pierce, “A Progressive Interpretation of 
Section 15(2) of the Charter” (1993) 57 Sask. L. Rev. 263 [hereinafter “Pierce”].  
31  Lovelace, supra, note 12, at para. 105. 
32  Id., at para. 108.  
33  Morris & Cheng, supra, note 7, at 299, find that after Lovelace, equality jurisprudence 
considering claims related to ameliorative programs reflected the “diminished significance” of 
s. 15(2). 
34  [1999] S.C.J. No. 12, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Law”]. 
35  See, e.g., Daphne Gilbert & Diana Majury, “Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of 
Canada Dooms Section 15” (2006) 24 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 111; Dianne Pothier, “Connecting 
Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real Experiences” (2001) 13 C.J.W.L. 37; Christopher 
D. Bredt & Adam M. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for Section 15” 
(2003) 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 33; Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, supra, note 21.  
36  Law, supra, note 14, at para. 51, the Court concluding, “the purpose of s. 15(1) is to 
prevent the violation of essential human dignity and freedom through the imposition of 
disadvantage, stereotyping, or political or social prejudice”. 
37  Id., at paras. 72-73. 
38  Id. 
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that in these situations it would be necessary to “consider justification 
under s. 1, or the operation of s. 15(2)”.39 
Both Lovelace and Law left open the possibility of revisiting the 
interpretation of section 15(2) in future, and in 2008 the Court did so in 
its first case of “reverse discrimination”: R. v. Kapp. The claimants in 
Kapp were primarily non-Aboriginal commercial fishers who challenged 
the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy (the “Strategy”), a federal program 
designed to “enhance aboriginal involvement in the commercial 
fishery”.40 As part of the Strategy, the government granted a communal 
fishing licence to three Aboriginal bands, permitting only band-
designated fishers to fish for salmon during a designated 24-hour period, 
and to sell any fish they caught. All other commercial fishers were 
excluded from the fishery during this time. The excluded fishers engaged 
in a “protest fishery” and were charged with fishing at a prohibited 
time.41 They challenged the communal fishing licence as an infringement 
of their equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter. 
In yet another unanimous section 15 decision,42 the Supreme Court 
agreed that the communal fishing licence created a distinction on the 
enumerated ground of race,43 but because the objective of the 
government program was “the amelioration of the conditions of a 
disadvantaged group” — the Aboriginal fishers — the Strategy was 
declared constitutional under section 15(2).44 In reaching its conclusion 
in Kapp, the Supreme Court established a new analytical framework for 
section 15 of the Charter.  
The Court first emphasized that sections 15(1) and (2) work together 
to promote the goal of substantive equality: section 15(1) “is aimed at 
                                                                                                             
39  Id. 
40  Kapp, supra, note 1, at paras. 6-7.  
41  Id., at para. 9. 
42  Eight judges concurred with the majority judgment based on s. 15 authored by McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Abella J. Justice Bastarache concurred in the result but concluded that s. 25 of the Charter 
provided a “complete answer” to the claim so there was no need to engage s. 15: Bastarache J. 
indicated that he was in “complete agreement with the restatement of the test for the application of 
s. 15” in the majority judgment: id., at paras. 76-77.  
43  For important insight on the Court’s reliance on race as the ground of differentiation in 
Kapp, see June McCue, “Kapp’s Distinctions: Race-Based Fisheries, the Limits of Affirmative 
Action for Aboriginal Peoples and Skirting Aboriginal People’s Unique Constitutional Status Once 
Again” (2008) 5 Directions 56. 
44  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 3. Commentators have rightly raised the question of whether 
Kapp was properly characterized as an “ameliorative program” given the context of Aboriginal 
fishing rights: see, e.g., Tremblay, supra, note 8.  
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preventing discriminatory distinctions that impact adversely on members 
of groups identified by the grounds enumerated in s. 15 and analogous 
grounds”, while section 15(2) “preserves the right of governments to 
implement … programs [aimed at helping disadvantaged groups improve 
their situations], without fear of challenge under s. 15(1)”.45 Following 
brief comments on section 15(1) which, without saying as much, strongly 
suggested a shift away from the Law framework46 and back to the 
broader language of the two-part test in Andrews,47 the majority of the 
Kapp decision focused on the “enabling”48 provision of section 15(2). 
Here, the Court did a conceptual about-face away from Lovelace, 
interpreting section 15(2) as having independent force to insulate 
ameliorative programs from scrutiny under section 15(1) of the Charter 
when two conditions are met:  
A program does not violate the s. 15 equality guarantee if the 
government can demonstrate that: (1) the program has an ameliorative 
or remedial purpose; and (2) the program targets a disadvantaged group 
identified by the enumerated or analogous grounds.49 
In order to demonstrate that an impugned law or program has an 
“ameliorative or remedial purpose” the Court found that an “intent-
based” analysis was appropriate, making the “legislative goal rather than 
actual effect … the paramount consideration”.50 In assessing whether a 
stated ameliorative purpose is “genuine”, it is appropriate to look to 
whether the legislature “chose means rationally related to that 
ameliorative purpose, in the sense that it appears at least plausible that 
                                                                                                             
45  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 16.  
46  Id., at paras. 17-22. The suggestion that Kapp ushered in a return to Andrews was 
confirmed in subsequent cases including, e.g., Ermineskin Indian Band Nation v. Canada, [2009] 
S.C.J. No. 9, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 222 (S.C.C.). See also Watson Hamilton & Koshan, “Courting 
Confusion?”, supra, note 7, at 934.  
47  The Andrews framework, supra, note 15, asks first, whether the law creates a distinction 
based on an enumerated or analogous ground, and second, whether that distinction creates a 
discriminatory disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping. The Court’s failure to 
provide further direction on its apparent shift away from Law or the proper application of Andrews 
led many to conclude that Kapp raised more questions — and more uncertainty — about s. 15(1) 
than it answered: see, e.g., Majury, supra, note 7, at 8-9; and Bruce Ryder, “R. v. Kapp: Taking 
Section 15 Back to the Future”, online: TheCourt <http://www.thecourt.ca/2008/07/02/r-v-kapp-taking-
section-15-back-to-the-future/>. 
48  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 25.  
49  Id., at para. 41. 
50  Id., at paras. 44 and 49. The Court was clear at paras. 50-52 that a satisfactory 
ameliorative purpose could be one of several objectives pursued by an impugned law or program.  
530 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
the program may indeed advance the stated goal of combating 
disadvantage”.51 If an impugned law or program is found to have a 
genuine ameliorative purpose, section 15(2) “precludes from s. 15(1) 
review distinctions made on enumerated or analogous grounds that serve 
and are necessary to the ameliorative program”.52  
Accordingly, the Court in Kapp established a “unified approach” to 
section 15.53 Once a claimant has demonstrated that an impugned law or 
program imposes differential treatment based on an enumerated or 
analogous ground (per the first step of Andrews), the government may 
argue pursuant to section 15(2) that the law or program has an 
ameliorative purpose targeting a disadvantaged group. If section 15(2) is 
satisfied, the law or program will be constitutional and will not be 
subject to any further scrutiny. Only where the government fails to meet 
its burden under section 15(2) will the law or program be subject to 
section 15(1), where the claimant can show that the distinction is 
discriminatory because it perpetuates prejudice or stereotyping (per the 
second step of Andrews).54 Finally, if discrimination is made out under 
section 15(1), the government can attempt to justify the law or program 
under section 1. The Court in Kapp again left open the possibility that 
this new analytical framework could require “some adjustment” in future 
cases.55  
In 2011, the Supreme Court considered the operation of the Kapp 
framework outside of the “reverse discrimination” context in Alberta v. 
Cunningham, which involved a claim that an ameliorative program was 
under-inclusive in its demarcation of the target group.56 The claimants 
                                                                                                             
51  Id., at para. 48. At para. 49 the Court explained that for the impugned distinction to be 
“rationally related” the government must demonstrate some kind of correlation between the program 
and the disadvantage that the target group experiences. 
52  Id., at para. 52. 
53  Tremblay, supra, note 8, at 183. 
54  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 40. 
55  Id., at para. 41. 
56  Cunningham, supra, note 5. Prior to Cunningham, there had been debate over whether 
Kapp was intended to be limited to the “reverse discrimination” context of Kapp, or whether it 
represented a global framework for all s. 15 equality claims: see, e.g., Nation Micmac de Gespeg 
v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [2009] F.C.J. No. 1656, 402 N.R. 313, at para. 9 
(F.C.A.) [hereinafter “Jean”], where Trudel J., considering the relevance of Kapp to the case of 
under-inclusion at issue, noted “(1) if Kapp had been intended to be read in a limited manner, the 
Supreme Court of Canada would have stated so; and (2) Kapp is part of the line of cases of Andrews 
… and Law … neither of which dealt with a case of reverse discrimination. Therefore, I do not 
believe that the teachings of Kapp should be rejected outright for the purposes of this appeal.” 
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were members of the Peavine Métis community in Alberta who 
registered under the Indian Act57 in order to obtain particular health 
benefits.58 The impugned legislation, the Métis Settlements Act 
(“MSA”),59 provides that voluntary registration under the Indian Act 
precludes membership in a Métis settlement, and on that basis the 
claimants were removed from the membership list of the Peavine 
community. They argued that the provisions of the MSA denying them 
membership in their Métis community infringed their equality rights 
under section 15(1) of the Charter.60 
The Supreme Court was unanimous in its application of the Kapp 
framework to the Cunningham claim. After concluding that the MSA 
differentiated between Métis who were registered under the Indian Act 
and Métis who were not, the Court turned to section 15(2).61 In assessing 
the ameliorative purpose of the MSA, the Court confirmed that the 
determination of purpose under section 15(2) was “a matter of statutory 
interpretation” to be undertaken with regard to “the words of the 
enactment, expressions of legislative intent, the legislative history, and 
the history and social situation of the affected groups”.62 Applying this 
analysis, the MSA was found to have a very specific ameliorative 
purpose: 
[T]he object of the MSA program is not the broad goal of benefiting all 
Alberta Métis, as the claimants contend, but the narrower goal of 
establishing a Métis land base to preserve and enhance Métis identity, 
culture and self-governance, as distinct from surrounding Indian 
cultures and from other cultures in the province.63  
                                                                                                             
57  Supra, note 26. 
58  For an important discussion on the role of choice in the Cunningham decision, see 
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF), Intervener Factum in Alberta (Minister of 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v Cunningham, online: LEAF <http://leaf.ca/ 
wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Factum_LEAF_Finale_Cunningham.pdf>, at paras. 22-25 
[hereinafter “LEAF Factum”]. See also Diana Majury, “Women are Themselves to Blame” in 
Faraday, Denike & Stephenson, supra, note 21, at 219.  
59  R.S.A. 2000, c. M-14 [hereinafter “MSA”]. 
60  The claimants in Cunningham also argued infringement of their rights to freedom of 
association and liberty under ss. 2(d) and 7 of the Charter; both claims were dismissed: Cunningham, 
supra, note 5, at paras. 89-95. 
61  Id., at paras. 56-58.  
62  Id., at para. 61. 
63  Id., at para. 62.  
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The distinction drawn in the MSA between Métis registered under the 
Indian Act and Métis who were not was found to be rationally related to 
this ameliorative object as required by Kapp.64 The Court clarified that 
the “serve and advance” threshold, enunciated in Kapp as requiring that 
the impugned distinction “serve and [is] necessary” to the ameliorative 
purpose of the law or program,65 does not require “proof that the 
exclusion is essential to realizing the object of the ameliorative 
program”.66 The government need only demonstrate that the distinction 
at issue “in a general sense serves or advances the [ameliorative] object of 
the program”.67 The distinction in the MSA was “saved” by section 15(2) 
and declared constitutional. 
Among the most pressing uncertainties since the framework 
established in Kapp was confirmed as the global approach to section 15 
in Cunningham are those related to the powerful role now played by 
section 15(2) in insulating government programs with an ameliorative 
purpose from review under section 15(1) and section 1 of the Charter. Of 
particular concern is the operation of section 15(2) in cases based on the 
under-inclusiveness or discriminatory effects of a government law or 
program with an ameliorative purpose. 
II. UNDER-INCLUSIVE AND DISCRIMINATORY AMELIORATIVE 
PROGRAMS 
In Kapp, the exemptive interpretation of section 15(2) was consistent 
with the purpose of that section: it insulated an ameliorative program 
targeting a disadvantaged group from a claim of “reverse discrimination” 
by a relatively more advantaged group. Accordingly, section 15(2) 
enabled the government to treat people differently in order to further 
substantive equality. The Kapp framework for section 15(2) operates in 
the name of substantive equality in the context of Kapp-style “reverse 
discrimination” claims. 
                                                                                                             
64  Id., at para. 73, finding that the distinction “is supported by historic distinctions between 
Métis and Indian culture, by the fact that, without the distinction, achieving the object of the 
program would be more difficult, and by the role of the Métis settlement in defining its 
membership”. 
65  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 52. 
66  Cunningham, supra, note 5, at para. 45.  
67  Id., at para. 45. 
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The same cannot be said of the Kapp framework where a section 15 
claim alleges that a government law or program is under-inclusive or has 
discriminatory effects. By situating the section 15(2) analysis in advance 
of the section 15(1) inquiry into discrimination and focusing exclusively 
on the purpose of an ameliorative program — a highly deferential 
analysis according to Cunningham — the Kapp framework ignores the 
possibility that a program with an ameliorative purpose could be 
discriminatory by virtue of its means or effects. An ameliorative program 
may be based on a discriminatory distinction within a disadvantaged 
group (as alleged in Cunningham) or between disadvantaged groups, or it 
may result in discriminatory or disadvantageous effects for some 
members of the targeted group or for other marginalized groups. Yet the 
Kapp framework forecloses arguments that a government law or program 
is both ameliorative and discriminatory at the same time.68  
The failure to interrogate the means or effects of an allegedly 
discriminatory law or program with an ameliorative purpose is at odds 
with a long line of jurisprudence confirming that Charter rights may be 
violated via purpose or effects.69 It is also fundamentally inconsistent 
with the principle of substantive equality that animates section 15. Key to 
the substantive approach is clear recognition that section 15 captures not 
only overt or purpose-based discrimination, but also discrimination 
arising from adverse effects70 and under-inclusion.71 Indeed, many of the 
foundational cases adjudicated under section 15 over the past two 
                                                                                                             
68  For a complete enunciation of the conceptual impossibility of arguing that a program is 
both ameliorative and discriminatory under the Kapp framework, see Watson Hamilton & Koshan, 
“Not Getting It”, supra, note 8, at 66-67; and LEAF Factum, supra, note 58, at paras. 8-18. 
69  See, e.g., Big M, supra, note 22, at para. 80. See also Watson Hamilton & Koshan, 
“Courting Confusion?”, supra, note 7, at 940-41, arguing that Kapp’s “resurrection of Andrews 
should have reinstituted the idea that unconstitutional purpose or effects of a law would be sufficient 
to prove a s. 15(1) claim”. 
70  Adverse effects claims allege that a facially neutral law (or one with an ameliorative 
purpose) has a more burdensome impact on members of an historically marginalized group. Adverse 
effects discrimination was described by the Supreme Court in Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 86, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624, at para. 62 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Eldridge”] (emphasis added):  
A legal distinction need not be motivated by a desire to disadvantage an individual or 
group in order to violate s. 15(1). It is sufficient if the effect of the legislation is to deny 
someone the equal protection or benefit of the law. As McIntyre J. stated in Andrews 
…“[t]o approach the ideal of full equality before and under the law ... the main 
consideration must be the impact of the law on the individual or the group concerned”.  
71  See, e.g., Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd., [1989] S.C.J. No. 42, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1219, at 
1240 (S.C.C.), concluding, “[u]nderinclusion may be simply a backhanded way of permitting 
discrimination”. See also Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] S.C.J. No. 29, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Vriend”]. 
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decades have involved claims that a benefit-conferring law or program is 
under-inclusive,72 including Lovelace,73 Egan v. Canada,74 Eldridge v. 
British Columbia,75 Vriend v. Alberta76 and M. v. H.77 These cases were 
clearly attuned to the possibility and particularities of ameliorative-
discriminatory government laws or programs.78 In Law, for example, the 
Court acknowledged that although the ameliorative character of a law or 
program is relevant in cases of “reverse discrimination”, it should not 
defeat a claim of under-inclusiveness: 
                                                                                                             
72  Watson Hamilton & Koshan explain in “Not Getting It”, supra, note 8, at 59: “Prior to 
Kapp, and subsequently, the Supreme Court has heard mainly section 15 challenges brought by 
disadvantaged claimants who sought to be included within ameliorative laws, programs or 
activities.” 
73  Supra, note 12. 
74  [1995] S.C.J. No. 43, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 513 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Egan”]. In Egan, the 
Court addressed the opposite-sex definition of “spouse” in the Old Age Security Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 
O-9. The majority concluded that the definition did not infringe equality rights because the 
distinction between opposite and same-sex couples was relevant to the purpose of the Act, which the 
majority described at 515 as the “support and protection” of legal marriage. In one of three 
dissenting opinions, Iacobucci J. found the objective of the Act to be the “alleviation of poverty in 
elderly households” and concluded that the exclusion of same-sex seniors from the legislation was 
not rationally connected to this goal, stating at 608, “[i]f there is an intention to ameliorate the 
position of a group, it cannot be considered entirely rational to assist only a portion of that group”. 
75  Supra, note 70. Eldridge involved a claim that a decision by hospital officials not to fund 
sign language interpretation as an insurable “medically necessary service” pursuant to the relevant 
provincial legislation infringed s. 15. The Court agreed that the hospital had violated the equality 
rights of deaf persons and reiterated at para. 73 that “once the state does provide a benefit, it is 
obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory manner … In many circumstances, this will require 
governments to take positive action, for example by extending the scope of a benefit to a previously 
excluded class of persons …” (citations omitted). 
76  Supra, note 71, where the Court was asked to assess a s. 15 claim based on the failure of 
the Alberta government to include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground of discrimination in the 
Individual Rights Protection Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. I-2. The purpose of the impugned legislation was 
ameliorative and described by the Court at para. 95 as “... to affirm and give effect to the principle 
that all persons are equal in dignity and rights ... [by] prohibit[ing] discrimination in a number of 
areas and with respect to an increasingly expansive list of grounds”. 
77  [1999] S.C.J. No. 23, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). In M. v. H., the Court considered 
whether the opposite-sex definition of “spouse” in Part III of the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, 
c. F.3 was under-inclusive and thereby discriminatory on the basis of sexual orientation. The 
definition was relevant to spousal support obligations under the Act. The majority of the Court 
at para. 71 “reject[ed] the idea that the allegedly ameliorative purpose of this legislation does 
anything to lessen the charge of discrimination in this case”. 
78  In Cunningham v. Alberta (Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development), 
[2009] A.J. No. 678, 8 Alta. L.R. (5th) 16, at para. 24 (Alta. C.A.) [hereinafter “Cunningham 
Appeal”], the Alberta Court of Appeal pointed out, “[i]f the discriminatory effects of specific 
provisions could be disregarded in light of an overall ameliorative purpose, cases like Vriend 
v Alberta … would no longer be good law”. 
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... An ameliorative purpose or effect … will likely not violate the 
human dignity of more advantaged individuals where the exclusion of 
these more advantaged individuals largely corresponds to the greater 
need or the different circumstances experienced by the disadvantaged 
group being targeted by the legislation. I emphasize that this factor 
[ameliorative purpose or effect] will likely only be relevant where the 
person or group that is excluded from the scope of ameliorative 
legislation or other state action is more advantaged in a relative sense. 
Underinclusive ameliorative legislation that excludes from its scope the 
members of a historically disadvantaged group will rarely escape the 
charge of discrimination.79  
Nevertheless, the Cunningham application of the Kapp framework to 
allegedly under-inclusive ameliorative legislation means that a 
government law or program with an ameliorative purpose and potentially 
discriminatory means or effects will often “escape the charge of 
discrimination” via the operation of section 15(2).  
The Supreme Court in Cunningham heard arguments in favour of 
recognizing the fundamental contextual differences between 
Cunningham-style claims of under-inclusiveness and Kapp-style claims 
of “reverse discrimination”.80 The Women’s Legal Education and Action 
Fund (“LEAF”), intervening in Cunningham, argued that in cases of 
under-inclusiveness “[w]here the fact of targeting is not challenged, the 
enabling feature of the s. 15(2) analysis is spent, and the preventive 
analysis of s. 15(1) is engaged”.81 LEAF urged the Court not to extend 
the Kapp framework to claims of under-inclusiveness, arguing that in 
such circumstances, the Kapp deference to legislative purpose means that 
section 15(2) serves to “shield from scrutiny discrimination within the 
[ameliorative] scheme”.82 When an under-inclusive law or program with 
an ameliorative purpose is at issue, the Kapp framework for section 15(2) 
does not operate in furtherance of substantive equality.83  
                                                                                                             
79  Law, supra, note 14, at para. 72 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
80  LEAF Factum, supra, note 58, at para. 4, explained that Kapp was a case of pure reverse 
discrimination because a relatively more privileged group challenged the “very fact” of the 
Aboriginal Fisheries program, seeking to invalidate it in its entirety by “insisting that equality 
required identical treatment — formal equality — for everyone”.  
81  Id., at para. 15.  
82  Id., at para. 10. 
83  Id., at para. 7, citing in part Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 16. LEAF made similar 
arguments about the applicability of Kapp at the Federal Court of Appeal in Jean, supra, note 56. 
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In an effort to embed the critical distinction between “reverse 
discrimination” and under-inclusiveness claims in the analytical 
framework of section 15, LEAF proposed the following “threshold 
questions” to determine whether section 15(2) is properly engaged in a 
given context: 
(1) Is the scheme ameliorative within the meaning of section 15(2)? 
- If yes, go to question 2 
- If not, section 15(2) is not engaged — go to section 15(1). 
(2) Is the challenge to the very fact of targeting (instead of delineation 
of the targeted group)?  
- If challenge to the very fact of targeting, section 15(2) is engaged — 
apply the two-step Kapp test. 
- If challenge to the delineation of targeted group, section 15(2) is 
not engaged — go to section 15(1).84 
LEAF’s argument was rejected in Cunningham. Despite reiterating 
that the “purpose of s. 15(2) is to save ameliorative programs from the 
charge of reverse discrimination” the Court either failed to appreciate 
that Cunningham was not a “reverse discrimination” case, or failed to see 
why under-inclusiveness cases demand a different approach.85 The Kapp 
framework was thus confirmed as the singular mode of analysis for all 
kinds of equality claims involving ameliorative programs. The global 
applicability of Kapp has translated to lower courts in Canada, which are 
now applying Kapp and Cunningham to “save” legislation with an 
ameliorative purpose even where the claim is based on under-
inclusiveness.86  
                                                                                                             
84  LEAF Factum, supra, note 58, at para. 18. 
85  Cunningham, supra, note 5, at para. 41 (emphasis added). 
86  See, e.g., Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2011] B.C.J. No. 931, 22 
B.C.L.R. (5th) 307 (B.C.S.C.), which involved a challenge to the provisions of the B.C. Adoption 
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5 and associated regulation B.C. Reg. 291/96 that establish the mechanisms 
whereby adult adopted children can obtain information about their biological parents. The claimant 
alleged the Act was under-inclusive because it did not include parallel provisions for “the benefit of 
adults conceived using sperm from an anonymous donor” at para. 224. The Attorney General, 
relying on Kapp, argued at para. 235 that s. 15(2) provided a complete “defence” to the claim. The 
trial judge, writing before the release of Cunningham, rejected the application of s. 15(2) at para. 239 
on the basis that the claim was not one of “reverse discrimination” but one of under-inclusiveness. 
On appeal ([2012] B.C.J. No. 2460, 37 B.C.L.R. (5th) 269 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Pratten CA”]), 
the B.C. Court of Appeal, writing after Cunningham, concluded that s. 15(2) was dispositive. The 
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The positioning of section 15(2) as a possible “trump card”87 in 
equality cases involving ameliorative laws or programs marks a major 
departure from earlier judicial interpretations that indicate this was 
precisely the reading of section 15(2) the Court initially sought to avoid. 
Faced with the opportunity to expand the role of section 15(2) in Lovelace, 
the Court declined to do so based on the purpose of section 15(2), the 
plain language of the text88 and in light of concerns about the internal 
coherence of section 15 and the process of Charter adjudication.89 The 
Lovelace Court explained:  
... treating s. 15(2) as an exception or defence would render s. 1 of the 
Charter redundant ... Such an approach would be inconsistent with the 
overall structure of the Charter, and consequently it is preferable ... to 
recognize the interpretive interdependence of ss. 15(1) and 15(2).90 
The Court in Lovelace preferred the interpretive reading of section 15(2) 
in order to ensure that the substance of an allegedly ameliorative law or 
program would be “subject to the full scrutiny of the discrimination 
analysis, as well as the possibility of a s. 1 review”.91 There was also 
acknowledgment that the structure of the Charter situates section 1 as the 
exclusive site92 whereby a government can “save” an impugned law or 
                                                                                                             
Adoption Act had as its purpose the amelioration of “the disadvantages created by the state-
sanctioned dissociation of adoptees [a disadvantaged group identified by an analogous ground] from 
their biological parents”. Given that the purpose was the targeting of adoptees only, the distinction 
between adoptees and donor offspring was rationally related to that purpose, and the distinction was 
“saved” under s. 15(2). Pratten’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was 
dismissed: [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 36 (S.C.C.). 
87  Hughes, supra, note 7, at 256. 
88  Lovelace, supra, note 12, at para. 105, finding it to be “clear that the s. 15(2) phrase ‘does 
not preclude’ cannot be understood as language of defence or exemption. Rather, this language 
indicates that the normal reading of s. 15(1) includes the kind of special program under review in 
this appeal.” 
89  Id., at paras. 106-107. 
90  Id., at para. 107 (referencing Drumbl & Craig, supra, note 23, at 122 on the redundancy 
of s. 1 if an exemptive approach to s. 15(2) was adopted). See also R. v. Hess; R. v. Nguyen, [1990] 
S.C.J. No. 91, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 906 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hess”], where McLachlin J. (as she then 
was), writing in dissent for herself and Gonthier J. on whether s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 could be “saved” under s. 15(2) because it had a beneficial purpose, warned: 
“Interpreted expansively ... it [s. 15(2)] threatens to circumvent the purpose of s. 1.”  
91  Lovelace, supra, note 12, at para. 108.  
92  The “notwithstanding clause”, Charter, supra, note 2, at s. 33, allows governments to 
declare that a law will operate notwithstanding the fact that it may infringe certain constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. See, e.g., Ford v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1988] S.C.J. No. 88, [1988] 
2 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.). 
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program, making an exemptive reading of section 15(2) inconsistent with 
the accepted process of Charter adjudication.  
It is unclear why the reasons for preferring the interpretive approach 
to section 15(2) set out in Lovelace and other early section 15 cases are 
no longer controlling. There was no evidence in Kapp that the 
interpretive approach to section 15(2) has failed to operate as the framers 
of the Charter intended; that is, there is no indication that an interpretive 
reading of section 15(2) has resulted in a landslide of successful “reverse 
discrimination” claims invalidating government efforts to implement 
ameliorative laws or programs. In fact, quite the opposite: it took 
23 years from the coming-into-force of section 15 for a single “reverse 
discrimination” claim to make it to the Supreme Court level.93 This does 
not mean that “reverse discrimination” claims are not being made,94 but 
it does suggest that existing Charter mechanisms have, to date, been 
sufficient to weed out such claims, either by concluding that an 
impugned distinction is not discriminatory under section 15(1)95 or by 
finding that an ameliorative program that discriminates against a more 
advantaged group is “reasonable” and “demonstrably justified” under 
section 1. It is also possible that the “mere presence of s. 15(2) … may 
serve as an effective disincentive to raising claims of ‘reverse 
discrimination’ in the first place”.96 
                                                                                                             
93  As noted above, that case was Kapp, supra, note 1. Although the Charter was formally 
adopted in 1982, s. 15 came into force three years later in 1985, so as to provide governments an 
opportunity to review existing legislation for Charter compliance. 
94  Among the first s. 15 cases, Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Phillips, [1986] N.S.J. No. 
401, 34 D.L.R. (4th) 633 (N.S.S.C.) was a challenge to a social welfare benefit available to single 
mothers but not single fathers. The Court found that the benefit scheme violated s. 15 because 
benefits should be conferred on both mothers and fathers or neither. The benefit scheme was 
ultimately struck down in its entirety.  
95  It is likely that many true “reverse discrimination” claims would fail at this juncture with 
a finding that the distinction at issue does not perpetuate stereotypes or prejudice against the 
relatively more advantaged claimant group, but instead corresponds to the actual circumstances of 
disadvantage of the group targeted by ameliorative legislation (the “correspondence” factor from 
Law, supra, note 14). See, e.g., the commentary of Arbour J.A. (as she then was) in Eaton v. Brant 
(County) Board of Education, [1995] O.J. No. 315, 22 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.) (revd on other 
grounds [1996] S.C.J. No. 98, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 241 (S.C.C.)), where the Ontario Court of Appeal at 
10-11 considered the relationship between s. 15(1) and (2) of the Charter in the context of special 
education for children with disabilities. 
96  Pierce, supra, note 30, at 264, suggests that one explanation for the near-total lack of 
direct attacks on ameliorative programs under s. 15 is that the existence of s. 15(2) implies that “any 
legal controversy over the constitutionality of such schemes has already been decided”.  
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The only hint as to the Court’s justification for adopting the 
exemptive interpretation of section 15(2) is the following statement from 
Kapp: “This approach has the advantage of avoiding the symbolic 
problem of finding a program discriminatory [under section 15(1)] before 
‘saving’ it as ameliorative ...”.97 
This “symbolic problem” may be live in cases of true “reverse 
discrimination”, where a finding of discrimination under section 15(1) 
could appear to validate a claim by a more advantaged group seeking to 
strike down an ameliorative program. However in the context of claims 
of under-inclusiveness, where a disadvantaged claimant alleges 
discriminatory exclusion from the benefits of an ameliorative program, 
the “symbolic problem” evaporates. In these cases, finding that an 
ameliorative law or program infringes a Charter right and then “saving” 
it under section 1, where it is appropriate to do so, seems entirely 
consonant with the accepted process of adjudicating rights, as noted in 
Lovelace, above.98 Indeed, taking a broad, purposive approach99 to the 
scope of substantive rights and then requiring express justification of 
limits is the hallmark of the Canadian approach.100  
In my view, the Court was wrong to extend the exemptive reading of 
section 15(2) established in Kapp to claims of under-inclusiveness in 
Cunningham. The most principled way forward would be for the Court to 
“reconsider its approach … by taking seriously the sort of alternative 
                                                                                                             
97  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 40 (emphasis added). 
98  Lovelace, supra, note 12.  
99  The “purposive” approach to interpreting Charter rights, first established in Hunter v. 
Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 156 (S.C.C.), was described in Big M, 
supra, note 22, at paras. 116-117 as requiring that “[t]he meaning of a right or freedom guaranteed 
by the Charter … be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such a guarantee; it [is] to be 
understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it was meant to protect”. 
100  See, e.g., Lorraine Weinrib, “The Supreme Court of Canada and Section One of the 
Charter” (1988) 10 S.C.L.R. 469, at 472, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has “consistently 
affirmed the need to keep the two stages of Charter argument distinct”; Christopher P. Manfredi, 
“The Canadian Supreme Court and American Judicial Review: United States Constitutional 
Jurisprudence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (1992) 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 213, at 
224. See also Carissima Mathen, “What Religious Freedom Jurisprudence Reveals About Equality” 
(2008) 6 J. L. & Equality 163, at 163, arguing that the judicial approach to the Charter guarantee of 
freedom of religion, where establishing a prima facie infringement of the Charter right is relatively 
“straightforward (because the right is defined broadly and from an almost completely subjective 
viewpoint)”, could benefit the complicated s. 15 jurisprudence. 
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proposed by LEAF” in Cunningham, above.101 However, only time will 
tell whether or when judicial reassessment of section 15 might actually 
occur. In the meantime, courts will continue to rely on the Kapp 
framework for section 15, necessitating careful reflection on how the 
issues described above might be mitigated within the general boundaries 
of Kapp. In the next section, I propose a possible interpretation of the 
Kapp framework that could reveal possibilities for addressing some of 
the problems with claims of under-inclusiveness and adverse effects 
where an ameliorative law or program is at issue. 
III. RE-READING SECTION 15(2) AS AN INTERNAL LIMIT ON 
EQUALITY 
Given the new interpretation of section 15(2) adopted in Kapp and 
extended in Cunningham to claims of under-inclusiveness, a new reading 
of section 15(2) is now required. In this section, I suggest that because 
the successful operation of section 15(2) circumvents section 15(1) of the 
Charter where an ameliorative law or program is at issue, section 15(2) 
can properly be understood as an internal limit on the right to equality 
guaranteed by section 15(1). After identifying the limit and setting it in 
context, I show how the operation of the section 15(2) limit effectively 
supplants the analysis under section 1 of the Charter. I then seek to 
establish a foundation for adapting the principle of proportionality 
embodied by the Oakes test to the section 15(2) context in order to 
respond to present problems with the application of the Kapp framework 
to section 15 claims based on under-inclusion or discriminatory effects 
where an ameliorative program is at issue.  
The limit on the equality guarantee imposed by the exemptive 
reading of section 15(2) can be stated as follows: Every individual has a 
right to equality before and under the law, and the right to equal 
protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination on the 
basis of enumerated or analogous grounds except in relation to a 
government law, program or activity that has as its purpose the 
amelioration of the situation of a disadvantaged group identified by 
enumerated or analogous grounds. Where a claimant runs up against the 
                                                                                                             
101  Watson Hamilton & Koshan, “Not Getting It”, supra, note 8, at 80, noting the particular 
barriers created by the Kapp approach to s. 15(2) for persons with disabilities seeking access to 
necessary services. 
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ameliorative law or program limit, his or her right to equality must yield 
without any inquiry into the impacts of the law or program on Charter 
rights, and with minimal justification required of the government seeking 
to rely on section 15(2). While this kind of limit might be appropriate in 
true cases of “reverse discrimination”, it is deeply problematic when 
applied to claims alleging that an ameliorative law or program is under-
inclusive or has adverse effects. 
Understanding section 15(2) as an internal limit on equality brings 
section 15 into the class of Charter rights with express internal limits, 
including, for example, section 7, which guarantees “[e]veryone has the 
right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice”.102 The Court has declared that section 7 represents a “qualified” 
right, meaning that a government may restrict the right so long as it does 
so in a manner consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.103 
The existence of the express limit in section 7 has been described by the 
Supreme Court as requiring “the delineation of the boundaries of the 
rights and principles in question”104 confirming the relevant conceptual 
work to be done when an internal limit is at issue.  
The most obvious place to begin delineating the scope of the 
section 15(2) limit on equality is by considering the operation of section 15(2) 
in displacing section 1 of the Charter. Section 1 is the established location 
where an impugned government law or program might be “saved” from a 
finding of unconstitutionality, but only after the government has satisfied 
“the exclusive justificatory criteria ... against which limitations on ... 
[Charter] rights and freedoms must be measured”.105 These “justificatory 
criteria” were originally established in the two-part test set out in R. v. 
Oakes.106 The Oakes test requires scrutiny of the purpose, means and 
effects of the law or program at issue, by asking first, whether the law or 
                                                                                                             
102  Charter, supra, note 2, at s. 7. Other rights with internal limits or qualifiers include s. 8, which 
guarantees: “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure” and s. 9, which 
provides: “Everyone has the right not to be arbitrarily detained or imprisoned” (emphasis added).  
103  R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151, at 179 (S.C.C.).  
104  R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] S.C.J. No. 79, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, at para. 97 (S.C.C.), 
citing R. v. Mills, [1999] S.C.J. No. 68, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668, at para. 66 (S.C.C.). 
105  Oakes, supra, note 11, at para. 63.  
106  Id. The Oakes analysis was modified in subsequent cases including, significantly, 
Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] S.C.J. No. 104, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Dagenais”] and Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] S.C.J. No. 37, 
[2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, at paras. 35 and 37 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wilson Colony”].  
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program pursues “an objective related to concerns which are pressing 
and substantial in a free and democratic society”;107 and second, whether 
the means chosen to pursue the objective are “reasonable and 
demonstrably justified”.108 This second inquiry involves a context-
specific proportionality assessment, whereby the Court looks to whether: 
(1) the means adopted are rationally connected to the objective; (2) the 
means impair Charter rights as minimally as possible; and (3) there is 
proportionality between the salutary and deleterious effects of the rights-
infringing measure. 
Under the Kapp framework, sections 1 and 15(2) now serve a similar 
function: each permit the state to justify an impugned law or program 
with the result that, if the justificatory criteria are satisfied, it will be 
declared constitutional notwithstanding the established infringement of 
Charter rights (in the case of section 1) or the alleged infringement of 
Charter rights (in cases where section 15(2) is operative).109 However, 
the government has a significantly less onerous task in seeking to uphold 
an impugned law or program under section 15(2) because it does not 
have to satisfy the Oakes test. Instead, the government need only bring 
evidence as to the ameliorative purpose of the law or program at issue, 
and demonstrate that the impugned distinction “in a general sense serves 
or advances the [ameliorative] object of the program”.110 This is a highly 
deferential test for section 15(2), providing only “minimal” scrutiny in 
the assessment of a program’s ameliorative purpose and no scrutiny as to 
its actual effectiveness.111  
Permitting declarations of constitutionality to be made by courts 
pursuant to section 15(2) on a considerably lower justificatory standard 
then that established in Oakes violates the spirit of the Charter, which 
guarantees Charter rights “subject only to such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
                                                                                                             
107  Id., at para. 69.  
108  Id., at para. 70.  
109  Drumbl & Craig, supra, note 23, at 122. 
110  Cunningham, supra, note 5, at para. 45.  
111  Majury, supra, note 7, at 10. Any inquiry into the actual effects of ameliorative 
legislation is prohibited. In Cunningham, supra, note 5, at para. 74, the Supreme Court concluded 
that the Alberta Court of Appeal “erred in demanding positive proof” that the impugned distinction 
(between Métis and Métis who are also status Indians) would have the effect of enhancing the 
ameliorative goals of the MSA program, concluding that “all the government need show is that it 
was rational for the state to conclude that the means chosen to reach its ameliorative goal would 
contribute to [its ameliorative] purpose”.  
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democratic society”.112 In Andrews the Court divided on the appropriate 
level of scrutiny under section 1 in equality cases, with the majority 
rejecting the argument by McIntyre J. that a relaxed standard was required 
so as not to unduly hinder the government line-drawing that is inherent to 
equality-enhancing laws or programs.113 Comparing the justificatory 
criteria in Oakes and Kapp, both of which can result in a finding that an 
impugned law or program is constitutional, it is clear that Kapp permits the 
justification of alleged limits on equality rights on a standard less 
burdensome then Oakes. Given that the Kapp framework applies equally 
to claims of “reverse discrimination”, under-inclusiveness and adverse 
effects discrimination, these divergent standards are cause for concern.  
In light of the equivalency between section 15(2) and section 1, the 
principles underpinning the section 1 limitations analysis are relevant to 
delineating the scope of the section 15(2) limit on equality rights. This 
means that proportionality should be part of the government’s burden in 
cases where it seeks to rely on section 15(2) to “save” an ameliorative 
program from scrutiny under section 15(1) and section 1 of the Charter. 
Recall that according to Kapp, once an equality claimant has 
demonstrated that an impugned law or program imposes differential 
treatment based on an enumerated or analogous ground, the government 
may trigger section 15(2) by showing that the law or program has a 
genuine ameliorative purpose targeting a disadvantaged group identified 
by grounds. Incorporating proportionality into the 15(2) analysis would 
expand the government’s burden by requiring that in order to “save” an 
impugned law or program pursuant to section 15(2), the government 
must demonstrate not only that the law or program has an ameliorative 
purpose, but also that the means chosen to pursue that ameliorative 
purpose and the established or anticipated effects of the ameliorative 
program are proportionate. 
There are substantive and structural reasons that proportionality is an 
appropriate conceptual tool for use in the section 15(2) context. First, 
                                                                                                             
112  Charter, supra, note 2, at s. 1. 
113  Andrews, supra, note 15, at 183. Justice Wilson confirmed that because “s. 15 is designed 
to protect those groups who suffer social, political and legal disadvantage in our society, the burden 
resting on government to justify the type of discrimination against such groups is appropriately an 
onerous one”. See also Lavoie v. Canada, [2002] S.C.J. No. 24, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 769 (S.C.C.), where 
differences of opinion regarding s. 1 re-emerged. Justice Arbour, concurring in the result, 
emphasized at para. 91 the importance of conducting the s. 1 analysis in cases of discrimination with 
“uncompromising rigour”.  
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despite the Court’s adoption in Kapp of a deferential, purpose-based test 
for ameliorative programs, there is “no evidence that s. 15(2) was 
enacted to aggressively promote affirmative action programs … or to 
blindly exempt such programs from constitutional scrutiny”.114 The 
Court’s comments in Kapp and Cunningham reveal anxiety, rooted in the 
American experience with “reverse discrimination” claims, about 
“inappropriate judicial intervention into [ameliorative] government 
programs”115 and concern that “courts will invalidate affirmative action 
schemes if they undertake a means analysis”.116 Yet Canadian courts 
regularly review the purpose, means and effects of complex social policy 
legislation in section 1, using proportionality review under Oakes. This 
makes proportionality a tested tool appropriate for assessing ameliorative 
programs pursuant to section 15(2).  
Second, requiring express consideration of the means and effects of 
an ameliorative program through proportionality review ensures that 
purpose does not over-determine the assessment of the constitutionality 
of an ameliorative law or program. By inquiring into means and effects, 
ameliorative programs that are under-inclusive or have discriminatory 
effects may be properly identified and, in accordance with the purpose of 
section 15(2), will not be exempted from further scrutiny. Ensuring that 
claims of under-inclusiveness and adverse effects are possible even 
where the impugned law or program has an ameliorative purpose is 
consistent with prior section 15 jurisprudence and the principle of 
substantive equality. 
Finally, given that section 15(2) displaces, or operates in place of 
section 1 when an ameliorative law or program is at issue, fidelity to the 
principles of Charter adjudication mean that section 15(2) should 
“[import] … the justification analysis from s. 1 of the Charter”.117 The 
                                                                                                             
114  Drumbl & Craig, supra, note 23, at 115. 
115  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 44, citing in part Pierce, supra, note 30. Legitimacy 
concerns related to judicial review of social programs have haunted Courts since the early days of 
the Charter. See, e.g., Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 85, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
429 (S.C.C.); and Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), [2005] S.C.J. No. 33, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791 
(S.C.C.). See also David Wiseman, “Competence Concerns in Charter Adjudication: Countering the 
Anti-Poverty Incompetence Argument” (2006) 51 McGill L.J. 503. 
116  Pierce, supra, note 30, at 273 finds these concerns compelling, concluding that a 
subjective test, focused narrowly on the “intention of those authorizing or creating the [ameliorative] 
scheme” is preferable to an objective test, which would include consideration of what a program 
actually or potentially achieves. 
117  Lovelace, supra, note 12, at para. 98, citing Manitoba Rice Farmers, supra, note 24, 
at 101-102 . 
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test for section 15(2) should mirror that in section 1 in order to ensure 
greater consistency between the “saving” provisions in sections 1 and 
15(2).118 Indeed, as noted below, pieces of the section 1 proportionality 
analysis are evident in existing jurisprudence on section 15(2), 
suggesting that the Court is well aware of the equivalency between 
sections 1 and 15(2). 
While a full enunciation of the shape of proportionality review in 
section 15(2) is beyond the scope of this inquiry, this section considers 
three key issues, particularly as they dovetail with or diverge from the 
Oakes assessment under section 1: first, context and the appropriate 
degree of deference; second, how the elements of Oakes might be  
re-crafted to suit the section 15(2) context; and, third, the resulting 
relationship between section 15(2) and section 1.  
1. Context and Deference in Section 15(2) 
Proportionality has long been celebrated by courts in Canada and 
elsewhere119 as the “preferred procedure for managing disputes involving 
an alleged conflict between two rights claims, or between a rights 
provision and a legitimate state or public interest”.120 Indeed, pre-Kapp 
inquiries have helpfully considered the role that proportionality might 
play in resolving a conflict “between a discrimination claim under 
s. 15(1) and an affirmative action claim under s. 15(2)”,121 consistent 
with the “paradigmatic situation” where proportionality analysis is 
triggered “once a prima facie case has been made to the effect that a right 
has been infringed by a government measure”.122 That the impugned law 
or program in fact violates a constitutional right is the critical backdrop 
                                                                                                             
118  Drubml & Craig, supra, note 23, at 122. 
119  See, e.g., Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), at 457 [hereinafter “Barak”], declaring that as a 
result of the reception of proportionality into numerous legal systems, “we now live in the age of 
proportionality”.  
120  Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 72, at 73 [hereinafter “Stone Sweet & 
Mathews”]. 
121  Tremblay, supra, note 8, at 202. Drumbl & Craig, supra, note 23, at 115-21, writing in 
1992, envisioned a proportionality test under s. 15(2) that is operative only after a claimant has 
demonstrated that his or her rights have been infringed under s. 15(1). 
122  Stone Sweet & Mathews, supra, note 120, at 75.  
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against which the proportionality analysis under section 1 of the Charter 
is conducted.  
However, the Supreme Court in Kapp complicated the application of 
proportionality to ameliorative programs under section 15(2) by 
positioning section 15(2) to be considered before an assessment of 
whether the impugned law or program is discriminatory within the 
meaning of section 15(1). All that is certain going into a section 15(2) 
inquiry is that a distinction has been drawn on an enumerated or 
analogous ground; the quality of that distinction is unknown. This means 
that proportionality cannot operate in the “paradigmatic” way that it does 
in section 1. The proportionality inquiry must be adjusted to attend to the 
fact that no rights infringement has been established when section 15(2) 
is triggered in the Kapp framework.123  
One way to frame proportionality review of an ameliorative law or 
program under section 15(2), notwithstanding that no rights infringement 
has been established, would be to focus on the relationship between the 
overall ameliorative purpose of the impugned law or program and the 
established distinction that treats the claimant differently (though not 
necessarily discriminatorily within the meaning of section 15(1)), in light 
of the purpose of section 15(2) and the right to substantive equality in 
section 15(1). The balance to be struck is then between the legitimate 
interests of the state in pursuing the ameliorative law or program, and the 
interests of the claimant who is excluded from that law or program.  
The particular context of section 15(2) has implications for the level 
of deference with which the proportionality assessment should be 
undertaken. While the context of an established rights infringement 
dictates “a stringent standard of justification” be imposed on a 
government attempting to uphold a limit on a Charter right under the 
Oakes test,124 the context of section 15(2) dictates a rather greater degree 
of deference will be appropriate when the proportionality of a genuinely 
ameliorative program is at stake.125 Distinctions drawn as part of an 
ameliorative program will always be part of a government attempt to 
                                                                                                             
123  Sheppard, supra, note 22, at 20 concludes that it would be inappropriate for courts to 
frame ameliorative programs as constituting prima facie violations of s. 15(1) because doing so 
would situate ameliorative programs as “exceptions to equality, rather than expression of it”.  
124  Oakes, supra, note 11, at para. 65.  
125  Sujit Choudhry, “So What is the Real Legacy of Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality 
Analysis Under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1” (2006) 34 S.C.L.R. (2d) 501, at 503 explains the role 
of deference in qualifying or tailoring the Oakes analysis to the particular context of a given case. 
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protect a socially vulnerable group and/or balance the interests of various 
social groups. These are circumstances with which Canadian courts are 
familiar; it is well-established that in Charter cases where a government 
law or program has as its goal the protection of a vulnerable group, or 
where the government is striking a balance between groups, relatively 
more deference to government line-drawing will generally be 
appropriate.126 This same logic counsels toward a higher degree of 
deference when a court is assessing an ameliorative law or program 
under section 15(2). A “measure of leeway” should be afforded 
governments to ensure that “the bar of constitutionality … [is not] … set 
so high that responsible, creative solutions to difficult problems would be 
threatened”.127 
However, the need for “leeway” should not result in minimal 
scrutiny of the complicated line drawing exercises and implementation 
strategies that are necessarily part of ameliorative laws and programs. 
The “drafters of the Charter surely could not have intended that the right 
against discrimination in s. 15(1) should be … easily evaded by the 
state”.128 The appropriate degree of deference should always be a 
context-specific decision with careful attention paid to the particular 
facts of a given case; not a strict requirement dictated by the analytical 
framework of section 15(2). It is in the context-specific assessment of 
deference that the nature of the claim related to an ameliorative program 
might properly be taken into account: because the purpose of section 15(2) 
is to insulate ameliorative programs from challenges of “reverse 
discrimination”, relatively more deference is appropriate in assessing 
these kinds of challenges; conversely, where the claim targets not the fact 
of an ameliorative program but its definition of the targeted group or its 
discriminatory effects on a disadvantaged group, the proportionality 
inquiry should be more stringent because these are not the kinds of 
claims that section 15(2) was designed to guard against. Affording 
express recognition to the differences between “reverse discrimination”, 
                                                                                                             
126  See, e.g., Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 
1 S.C.R. 927, at 993 (S.C.C.). The Court explained, “as courts review the results of the legislature’s 
deliberations, particularly with respect to the protection of vulnerable groups, they must be mindful 
of the legislature’s representative function”.  
127  Wilson Colony, supra, note 106, at paras. 35 and 37. 
128  Drumbl & Craig, supra, note 23, at 115-16, argue, based on a pre-Kapp reading of s. 15(2), that 
“the overriding principle which should inform the interpretation of s. 15(2) is scepticism. Courts should be 
cautious when entertaining the argument that discrimination is justified under s. 15(2).” 
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under-inclusiveness and adverse effects claims will permit a court to 
adjust its level of deference to better accord with the purpose of section 
15(2) and the principle of substantive equality.  
2. Proportionality Analysis in Section 15(2) 
(a) Pressing and Substantial Objective/Ameliorative Objective 
Under the Oakes test, the pressing and substantial objective inquiry 
requires that “the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit 
on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be of sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or 
freedom”.129 The differing context of section 15(2) mandates that this 
first stage be re-conceptualized as requiring the government to 
demonstrate that the impugned distinction is part of a law or program 
with a genuinely ameliorative purpose. This inquiry aligns generally with 
the first stage of Kapp, where a court will assess the sincerity of the 
government’s assertion of ameliorative purpose with reference to the 
language of the provision, the legislative history and the situation and 
needs of the targeted group.130  
The appropriate degree of deference must be applied carefully at the 
ameliorative object stage, because the definition of the purpose of an 
impugned law or program colours the rest of the proportionality analysis. 
It is always possible that a court may cast legislative purpose according 
to its own terms, despite what the parties argue.131 This was the case in 
Cunningham, where the Supreme Court adopted a considerably narrower 
reading of the purpose of the MSA then that advanced by the claimants 
and accepted at the Court of Appeal. As a result, the framing of the 
purpose by the Supreme Court essentially “buil[t] the challenged 
provision — excluding those with Indian status — into the rationale for 
the [MSA] program”.132  
Courts will also need to develop a principled approach to what 
constitutes an ameliorative law or program for the purposes of section 15(2); 
                                                                                                             
129  Oakes, supra, note 11, at para. 69, citing Big M, supra, note 22, at 352. 
130  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 47; Cunningham, supra, note 5. 
131  The Court in Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 46 affirmed that in assessing an allegedly 
ameliorative purpose, there is no need for the court to “slavishly accept the government’s [or the 
claimant’s] characterization of its purpose”.  
132  Watson Hamilton & Koshan, “Not Getting It”, supra, note 8, at 67.  
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surely not all social legislation conferring a benefit on a group identified 
by grounds is properly captured by section 15(2). In Kapp the Court did 
not define “ameliorative”, although it did state that “broad societal 
legislation, such as social assistance programs” would not fall within the 
ambit of section 15(2).133  
(b) Rational Connection/Rationally Related Means 
The rational connection inquiry under section 1 looks to whether 
“the measures adopted … [are] … carefully designed to achieve the 
objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair or based on 
irrational considerations.”134 In the context of section 15(2) the “means” 
at issue will always be the established distinction on an enumerated or 
analogous ground created by the impugned ameliorative law or program. 
The rational connection inquiry must then be re-cast for the purposes of 
section 15(2) as asking whether the distinction at issue (the means) is 
rationally related to the ameliorative object of the law or program.  
The rational relationship between object and means is included in the 
current Kapp framework as part of the inquiry into whether the law or 
program has a “genuinely” ameliorative object.135 A distinction is 
rational, according to Kapp, if there exists a “correlation between the 
[ameliorative] program and the disadvantage suffered by the target 
group”.136 In my view this inquiry should not focus solely on why the 
government included the groups it included, but must also ask, is the 
exclusion of the claimant group rationally related to the ameliorative 
purpose of the law or program?137 Requiring justification of the exclusion 
of the claimant group will ensure that there is a significant connection 
between the means and the ameliorative purpose of the law or program. 
A useful example of how the rationally related means analysis might 
be framed in a section 15(2) case is the decision of the Alberta Court of 
                                                                                                             
133  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 55. Watson Hamilton & Koshan, “Courting Confusion?”, 
supra, note 7, at 948 question whether or not human rights legislation, such as that at issue in Vriend, 
supra, note 71, would qualify as an ameliorative law for the purposes of s. 15(2). 
134  Oakes, supra, note 11, at para. 70. 
135  In Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 48, the Court found it appropriate to look to “whether the 
legislature chose means rationally related to [the] ameliorative purpose, in the sense that it appears at 
least plausible that the program may indeed advance the stated goal of combating disadvantage”.  
136  Id., at para. 49.  
137  I am indebted to Daphne Gilbert for her input on this point. 
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Appeal in Cunningham.138 The Court of Appeal accepted that the purpose 
of the MSA was “to aid the enhancement and preservation of Métis 
culture and identity, and enable a degree of self-governance … [and] … 
to preserve a Métis land base”.139 Applying the Kapp framework, the 
Court of Appeal held that in order for the exclusion of the claimant group 
— Métis who were also status Indians — to be justified under section 15(2), 
“that exclusion must have a rational connection to the enhancement and 
preservation of Métis culture and self-governance, and to the securing of 
a Métis land base”.140 The Court of Appeal concluded that the exclusion 
of Métis registered under the Indian Act was “relatively arbitrary” and 
thus did “not rationally advance the purported legislative purposes of the 
MSA”.141 The Court refused to apply section 15(2) to exempt the MSA 
from scrutiny under section 15(1).  
(c) Minimal Impairment/Justified Distinction 
Under Oakes, the minimal impairment stage is closely related to 
rational connection, and has been variously described as requiring that 
the means impair Charter rights “as little as possible”,142 “as little as is 
reasonably possible”,143 “no more than necessary”144 and as asking 
“whether there are less harmful means of achieving the legislative 
goal”.145 Once again, because in the section 15(2) context no rights 
infringement has been established some revision to the usual minimal 
impairment inquiry is required.  
A helpful starting point recalls that the crux of the minimal 
impairment or “necessity” component of proportionality analysis 
“demands that the means selected by the law to fulfill the law’s purpose 
                                                                                                             
138  Cunningham Appeal, supra, note 78, at paras. 19-31. 
139  Id., at para. 24. 
140  Id. 
141  Cunningham, supra, note 5, at para. 32. 
142  Oakes, supra, note 11, at para. 70, citing Big M, supra, note 22, at 352. 
143  R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] S.C.J. No. 70, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, at 722 (S.C.C.). 
144  RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1995] S.C.J. No. 68, [1995] 
3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160 (S.C.C.). 
145  Wilson Colony, supra, note 106, at para. 53, per McLachlin C.J.C.; but see the dissenting 
opinions of Abella and LeBel JJ., who take issue with the majority’s re-reading of minimal 
impairment as considering only those means which could achieve the legislative goal to maximum 
effectiveness. 
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be necessary”.146 In the section 15(2) context this element would require 
that the distinction drawn be necessary to the ameliorative purpose of the 
law, permitting courts to review the government line-drawing exercise 
and, importantly, to capture legitimate claims of under-inclusiveness. In 
Cunningham, the Court recognized (though did not elaborate on) the 
possibility that demonstrating the necessity of an impugned distinction 
might properly be part of the section 15(2) inquiry: 
A purposive approach to s. 15(2) focussed on substantive equality 
suggests that distinctions that might otherwise be claimed to be 
discriminatory are permitted, to the extent that they go no further than 
is justified by the object of the ameliorative program. To be protected, 
the distinction must, in a real sense, serve or advance the ameliorative 
goal …147  
The question at this stage then becomes: “does the distinction go no 
further than is justified by the object of the ameliorative program?” 
Based on the statement from Cunningham, a distinction will be justified 
so long as it “serves or advances” the ameliorative goal. A court could 
most readily assess the question of whether a distinction is justified by 
looking for evidence that the ousting of the excluded group was 
necessary in order to ameliorate the conditions of another group 
identified by the enumerated or analogous grounds.  
There are clear risks that inhere in the question of whether a 
distinction is “justified” in the way anticipated in Cunningham, above. 
Not least, if the assessment is reduced to a singular question of whether 
the included and excluded groups “share a similar history of 
disadvantage and marginalization” (a factor which did not stop the 
Cunningham court from justifying the exclusion of some Peavine Métis 
from the MSA) then the analysis could quickly descend into pure 
formalism, leading claimants to argue that they are so similar to the 
targeted group that their exclusion fails to “serve and advance” the 
ameliorative purpose of the impugned law, program or activity.148 Courts 
                                                                                                             
146  Barak, supra, note 119, at 540. In the American “strict scrutiny” test, a similar 
component requires that rights-infringing legislation be “narrowly tailored” to use the least drastic or 
least intrusive means available. 
147  Cunningham, supra, note 5, at para. 45 (emphasis added). 
148  Id., at para. 86. Watson Hamilton & Koshan, “Not Getting It”, supra, note 8, at 73 note 
the particularly troubling implications of this risk for persons with disabilities and helpfully point to 
Nova Scotia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin, [2003] S.C.J. No. 54, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 504 
(S.C.C.) as an example of a case where the Court found (at para. 102) that a distinction drawn in 
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would need to be wary of these risks and take a robust, substantive 
approach to the question of whether the exclusion of the claimant group 
truly “serves and advances” the purpose of the program, with a view to 
the principle enunciated in Eldridge that “once the state does provide a 
benefit, it is obliged to do so in a non-discriminatory manner”.149 To this 
end, evidence that the established distinction is arbitrary or is based on 
stereotypes or prejudice, the hallmarks of discrimination under section 
15(1), would indicate that a distinction is not justified at this stage. 
Also relevant to the determination of whether a distinction passes the 
justified distinction stage would be the alternatives available to the 
government in pursuing its ameliorative object. Similar to the minimal 
impairment step of Oakes, a court could look to evidence that the 
government considered and rejected other, more inclusive options to 
fulfill its ameliorative objective. So, for example, where evidence exists 
that a government opted not to extend benefits in an ameliorative 
program to all members of an enumerated or analogous group because of 
concerns about cost, a court may conclude that the distinction is not 
justified because it does not serve the ameliorative purpose of the 
program but rather the financial considerations of the government.150 
(d) Salutary and Deleterious Effects/Ameliorative and Deleterious 
Effects 
The final stage of proportionality analysis under section 1 requires 
that “both the underlying objective of a measure and the salutary effects 
that actually result from its implementation be proportionate to the 
deleterious effects the measure has on fundamental rights and 
freedoms”.151 Depending on “the severity of the deleterious effects of a 
measure on individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by the 
purposes it is intended to serve”.152 This stage is important because it is 
                                                                                                             
workers’ compensation legislation that excluded persons with certain kinds of disabilities from full 
benefits was “inconsistent with the ameliorative purpose of the Act”. 
149  Eldridge, supra, note 70, at para. 73.  
150  The Court has generally held that “budgetary considerations cannot be used to justify a 
[rights] violation under s. 1”: Schachter v. Canada, [1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679, at 
709 (S.C.C.), though in certain circumstances, cost has served as a “pressing and substantial 
objective” sufficient to limit rights: see, e.g., Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE, [2004] 
S.C.J. No. 61, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 381 (S.C.C.). 
151  Dagenais, supra, note 106, at 887 (emphasis in original).  
152  Oakes, supra, note 11. 
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here that the actual effects of the impugned law or program are expressly 
considered.153 The inquiry could be substantially similar under 
section 15(2), assessing the ameliorative effects of the impugned law or 
program and then considering the deleterious impacts on the claimant group 
of exclusion from the law or program at issue.  
The inquiry into ameliorative effects would look specifically to 
whether or not the ameliorative purpose of the government law or 
program is in fact realized, in whole or in part. While the government 
should be required to show evidence demonstrating the actual or 
anticipated effectiveness of the law or program, it is clear from the 
section 1 context that the evidentiary threshold will not be stifling.154 The 
Court in Kapp was concerned that requiring a program to be effective at 
ameliorating disadvantage in order to be constitutional would dissuade 
governments from adopting “innovative [ameliorative] programs, even 
though some may ultimately prove to be unsuccessful”.155 However, 
given the significance of the result where section 15(2) is operative — 
insulation from full Charter scrutiny — it seems reasonable to require 
some evidence that a law or program has done or will likely do what it 
purports to do. Requiring evidence of the effects of an ameliorative law 
or program would ensure that section 15(2) is not used as a sword to 
exempt from more searching review laws or programs with an 
ameliorative aim that are ultimately ineffective, or those that are 
paternalistically imposed by governments but do not actually function to 
the advantage of disadvantaged groups.156  
The deleterious effects stage is where an ameliorative program with 
adverse effects might properly be captured in section 15(2). Here a court 
would consider the negative impact on the claimant of the impugned 
                                                                                                             
153  In Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, 
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 877, at para. 125 (S.C.C.), the Court explained, “[t]he third stage of the 
proportionality analysis provides an opportunity to assess, in light of the practical and 
contextual details which are elucidated in the first and second stages, whether the benefits 
which accrue from the limitation are proportional to its deleterious effects as measured by the 
values underlying the Charter”.  
154  Wilson Colony, supra, note 106, at para. 85, adopted a deferential threshold at the 
salutary effects stage, finding “a government enacting social legislation is not required to show that 
the law will in fact produce the forecast benefits. Legislatures can only be asked to impose measures 
that reason and the evidence suggest will be beneficial”.  
155  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 47 
156  See M. David Lepofsky & Jerome E. Bickenbach, “Equality Rights and the Physically 
Handicapped” in Anne F. Bayefsky & Mary Eberts, eds., Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 323. 
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distinction resulting in exclusion from the ameliorative program. The 
assessment should be contextual and specific and may rely on evidence 
that the distinction itself, or exclusion from the ameliorative program, 
has the effect of “perpetuating group disadvantage and prejudice … or 
impos[ing] disadvantage on the basis of stereotyping”.157 The Court in 
Kapp emphasized that sections 15(2) and 15(1) “work together to 
promote the vision of substantive equality that underlies s. 15 as a 
whole”, meaning that the section 15(1) definition of discrimination might 
rightly inform the assessments at both the deleterious effects and justified 
distinction stages, as noted above.158 Where an ameliorative law or 
program fails to have actual ameliorative effects, or where a program 
with an ameliorative purpose has disproportionately deleterious results, 
proportionality will not be made out and section 15(2) should fail.  
3. Relationship between Section 15(2) and Section 1 
The obvious question that arises from the proposal to read section 15(2) 
as an internal limit on section 15(1) and incorporate proportionality 
review into the definition of that limit relates to the relationship that 
would then exist between section 15(2) and section 1. In order to 
preserve consistency between the “saving” provisions of the Charter, 
where an ameliorative program fails the section 15(2) proportionality 
assessment, it cannot then be justified under section 1.159 This is 
consistent with the general approach to internal limits under section 7, 
where the Supreme Court has held that a violation of section 7 of the 
Charter might only be justified under section 1 in very rare cases, akin to 
emergency.160 
Accordingly, if the government seeks to justify a program according to 
section 15(2) because it believes it is a proportionate ameliorative 
program, and fails, the analysis turns to section 15(1) where the claimant 
attempts to establish that the impugned distinction is in fact discriminatory. 
                                                                                                             
157  Kapp, supra, note 1, at para. 25. 
158  Id., at para. 16. 
159  In Manitoba Rice Farmers, supra, note 24, an early s. 15 case, the Manitoba Queen’s 
Bench that took the view that s. 15(2) represented a narrow exception to s. 15(1) and as a result 
concluded that where a government relies unsuccessfully on s. 15(2) to “exempt” a program from 
further review, the program cannot subsequently be justified under s. 1.  
160  See, e.g., Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) S 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. 
No. 73, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at para. 119 (S.C.C.). See also Kent Roach, “Common Law Bills of 
Rights as Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures” (2005) 55 U.T.L.J. 733, at 764. 
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If it is, the law, program or activity will be deemed unconstitutional 
without further recourse to section 1. Sections 1 and 15(2) are mutually 
exclusive. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
According to the Supreme Court, “[t]he rights enshrined in s. 15(1) 
of the Charter ... reflect the fondest dreams, the highest hopes and finest 
aspirations of Canadian society ... The difficulty lies in giving real effect 
to equality.”161 That difficulty takes new form in the Court’s latest 
iteration of the framework of analysis for section 15: by establishing 
section 15(2) as an exemptive provision for government laws or 
programs with an ameliorative purpose, no matter the nature of the 
equality claim, the Supreme Court in Kapp and Cunningham established 
a significant barrier for equality claimants. The deferential approach to 
ameliorative programs in Kapp goes too far in trusting that governments 
understand how to operationalize substantive equality through 
ameliorative programs, and is inconsistent with the purpose of section 15(2) 
and with prior equality jurisprudence. Ultimately, the Court should re-
visit the “unified approach” to section 15 with express recognition of the 
differential operation of section 15(2) in cases of “reverse discrimination” 
and cases of adverse effects or under-inclusiveness.162  
In the meantime, the Court’s “about-face” on the interpretation of 
section 15(2) requires that equality scholars, advocates and activists 
consider opportunities for the development of a more principled Kapp 
framework. In this paper I have proposed one possible strategy: if the 
interpretation of section 15(2) as an exemptive provision is to endure, it 
is necessary to understand section 15(2) as an internal limit on 
constitutional equality rights and to then argue for the inclusion of 
context-specific proportionality review of ameliorative programs at the 
section 15(2) stage. This adjustment would make the Kapp test for 
ameliorative programs more consistent with section 1 and may mitigate 
the serious risk that under-inclusive ameliorative programs and those 
with discriminatory effects will be “saved” by section 15(2), while 
preserving the purpose of section 15(2) in protecting ameliorative laws 
and programs from claims of true “reverse discrimination”.  
                                                                                                             
161  Vriend, supra, note 71, at paras. 67-68. 
162  Tremblay, supra, note 8, at 183. 
 
